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Abstract: The study of political religion has focused on how religious structure
and substance came to permeate grand political ideologies such as fascism and
communism. The relevance of various relatively veiled forms of religion in
modern day-to-day democratic politics has been undervalued and we
therefore fail to appreciate to what extent, and how religious structure and
substance have also penetrated conventional democratic politics. As a result,
we do not comprehend that it is the progressive abolition of “quasi-
messianism” in politics that is currently causing the existential problem of
democracy, namely massive political disaffection. Quasi-messianism
concerned the visionary anticipation of a better world that is attainable, here
and in the distant, yet foreseeable future. This promise accorded politics an
enchanting quality. Quite down-to-earth political ventures got charged with
an inspiring and imaginative sense of purpose, direction, and meaning, but
equally with this-worldly catalysts, which, in contrast to the political-
religious grand utopias, were operational and practical. In this quality, some
mass political projects or elite missions developed a capacity to enchant the
political elite and the public alike. Hence the thesis that it is the
disenchantment of politics, which lies at the heart of the contemporary
phenomenon of waning political allegiance.
1. INTRODUCTION
We imagine that we live in secular times and that the great accomplish-
ment of political democracy is that it eliminated political theology,
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freeing authoritative collective decision making from the command of
God. The “great separation” (Lilla 2007) between political philosophy
and theology that characterizes the West underpins our understanding
of politics as exclusively dealing with human rather than divine affairs.
A crucial condition for democracy concerns the “twin tolerations,”
where democratically elected governments are free from interference
by religious authorities, and religious organizations in civil and political
society are free from state intrusion (Stepan 2001). The separation of
church and state has been held a vital condition for democratic politics.
Yet, at the same time, we realize that the great separation, the twin tol-
erations and the separation of church and state did not bring about (or
were not meant to introduce, for that matter) the complete severance of
politics and religion. In fact, paradoxically, 19th century liberal anti-
clericalism, for instance, produced on the European continent a fierce
state-church social cleavage that impregnated the, at the time, moderniz-
ing political systems with politicized religious issues, and inadvertently
caused the formation of parties of religious defence (Kalyvas 1996;
Ertman 2009), thus firmly establishing a political role for religion in poli-
tics in Europe. Also, religion has long held sway over political attitudes
and behavior (e.g., voting) and to a considerable extent still does, as evi-
denced by the survival and continuing importance of Christian demo-
cratic, and other religious political parties (Van Kersbergen 2008). And
in spite of the constitutional “wall of separation” between church and
state in the United States, there is a pervasive presence of “God” in
American politics (Gunn 2007), which is not limited to the Christian
right, but continues to permeate the whole political spectrum. United
States President Barack Obama’s inaugural speech, for instance, can be
seen as an attempt to revive or revitalize American civil religion, particu-
larly by grounding American ideals in religious convictions (Bellah
2009; Copulsky 2009; Kim 2009). Obama spoke of “the God-given
promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to
pursue their full measure of happiness.”
Moreover, it was to appreciate the various ways in which religious
forms, concepts, explanations, and predictions are carried over into
secular politics, where concepts of “political religion” were developed
and are still thought to be useful. I am thinking of such notions as “mis-
sionary politics,” “political messianism,” “quasi-religions,” “millenarian-
ism,” “political religion,” “implicit religion,” “invisible religion,” “public
religion,” and “secular religion” (Zu´quete 2007; Smith 1994; Talmon
1960; Gray 2007; Bailey 1998; Lord 2008; Besecke 2005; Casanova
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1994; Voegelin 2000; Maier 2004; Burrin 1997; see Fig. 1). Eisenstadt
(2005, 161), in his work on multiple modernities, has argued that
“many central and continual dimensions and tensions of the cultural
and political program of modernity and of modern political dynamics
are deeply rooted in the religious components of the civilization which
they developed, and that these dimensions and tensions constitute in
many ways the transformation, even if in secular terms, of some of the
basic religious orientations and the tensions that have been constitutive
of these civilizations.” In Eisenstadt’s view, it is particularly the
Jacobin component of modernity that transfers to politics much of the
religious past. Jacobinism, moreover, nurtures the clash between plural-
ism and totalitarianism. Eisenstadt uses this specific term for that
feature in the program of modernity, which promulgates the extreme
revolutionary opinion. Its various manifestations are linked to the reli-
gious past to the extent that they translated visions of how to bring the
Kingdom of God to earth into a political program of how to build
heaven on earth. They thus carried such visionary programs from the
margins of religious eccentricity to the center stage of politics.
FIGURE 1. A continuum of politics and religion: Politics traversing the
boundaries of religion and vice versa.
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Such concepts of political religion were developed, and then applied,
in order to capture the important feature of the political realities of a
secularizing Europe that was, and still is, not quite secular. Political reli-
gions can be seen as “surrogates for traditional religion in an age of
increasing disbelief or doubt” (Burleigh 2005, 10), essentially providing
a secular solution to existential angst. The political religions were secular,
but still followed the internal structural design of religions. This is what
Raymond Aron (1996, quoted in Burleigh 2005: 10) had in mind when he
defined the secular religions as “the doctrines that in the souls of contem-
poraries take the place of a vanished faith, and that locate humanity’s sal-
vation in this world, in the distant future, in the form of a social order that
has to be created.” Burleigh (2005, 11) asks whether political religions
perhaps embodied “some halfway stage in times when the symbolic
world of Christianity was still a known reality, albeit challenged by
secular creeds so untried that their dangers were not widely apparent?”
The emergence of political religions seems to be one way in which the
structural differentiation of society, one of modernity’s crucial character-
istics, has unfolded, whereby politics and religion developed into increas-
ingly more strictly separated subsystems of society, in which the function
of the religious subsystem became to contend with other-worldly affairs
and the political subsystem emerged to deal, among other things, with
this-worldly matters (Luhmann 1982). It points to the phenomenon that
even in secularization as differentiation (that is, in secularity 1 in
Taylor’s (2007) vocabulary and narrative), something of the religious
past is transcribed into the secularized political ventures of modernity.
In other words, the differentiated subsystems still overlap or intersect
to a considerable extent, and it is here that we find various mixtures of
religion and politics in more or less veiled forms. Structural differen-
tiation, of course, implies competition between religion and politics,
while the various modes of fusion between the two also generate
confusion: ambiguity of authority (legitimate power to decide) and uncer-
tainty of jurisdiction (legitimate power to execute). Both competition and
confusion generate conflict (see Stark and Bainbridge 1996, ch 9) and in
the process, some of the religious components in political projects might
be either accentuated or played down.
This nexus between religion and politics tended to be studied by
looking at how religious structure and substance came to permeate and
shape such grand (Jacobin) political ideologies as fascism and commun-
ism. At the same time, however, we have largely, and in my view erro-
neously, downplayed the relevance of various relatively veiled forms of
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religion in modern day-to-day democratic politics,1 basically assuming
that in such systems, religion has retreated (or would very soon do so)
to the private sphere, and that the struggle over power is carried out on
purely secular conditions (Bruce 2003). As a result, we have missed,
underestimated, or failed to recognize, to what extent and how, in fact,
religious structure and substance have penetrated and influenced conven-
tional democratic politics.
The point of my undertaking here is that, because we have trouble
seeing the enclosed religious dimension of democratic politics, we do
not comprehend that it is the progressive abolition of what I call political
quasi-messianism in politics that is currently causing the widely recog-
nized existential problem of democracy, namely massive political disaf-
fection. Quasi-messianism, as embodied in certain political projects
and missions, concerned the visionary anticipation of a better world
that is attainable, here and in the distant, yet foreseeable future. In con-
trast to the religions proper, this better world was defined as within
reach in this world through human collective intervention that aimed to
implement improvements in the human condition, which, because of
their promise, had an enchanting quality. In this quasi-messianism, pol-
itical callings assumed a role that is similar to the savior in messianism
proper, offering relief and hope for this-worldly redemption.
Quite down-to-earth political projects, say major social security
projects, got charged with an inspiring and imaginative sense of
purpose, direction and meaning, but equally with this-worldly catalysts,
which, in contrast to the political-religious grand utopias (the political
religions), were operational and practical. In this quality, some mass
political projects or elite missions — and my European examples are
Nation-State Building, Democratization, Welfare State, and European
Integration — developed a capacity to enchant the political elite and
the public alike, without invoking the Jacobin temptation so dangerously
present in the political religions. Taking on this analysis yields the thesis
that it is the disenchantment of politics, that is to say, the abolition of the
quasi-messianism in the projects or missions, which lies at the heart of
the contemporary phenomenon of waning political allegiance.
There is a long tradition of comparative research — starting with
De Tocqueville’s (2000) Democracy in America via Almond and Verba’s
(1963) The Civic Culture to Putnam’s (1993) Making Democracy Work
and further — that connects the fate of democracy to the vitality of
civil society. In recent decades, we have learned much about how
social capital, that is to say, people’s extended bonds within and
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between social networks, and trust function as the societal glue, which
holds a society together. This adhesive also secures, to cross-nationally
variable degrees of course, an orderly, stable, vital, and well-performing
democratic system and a healthy political life. Although recently receiving
somewhat less attention, we also know quite a bit about the reverse causal
arrow, namely how democratic politics can help to pacify and resolve deep
social, economic and cultural conflicts, and how politics contributes to
societal and cultural integration (particularly, but not exclusively,
through consociational devices, see Steiner and Ertman 2002).
Indeed, politics is decisive for the fate of society (which can be any-
thing between the extremes of thriving existence and total breakdown)
and concerns all social activities of (groups of) individuals to handle
their collective problems and resolve their conflicts of interests.
Ultimately, it is the threat of violence, also in democracies, which is
the most important source of power in the struggle over who decides
which collective solutions will prevail. Constitutional democracies,
however, are polities that have institutionalized the conditions under
which public power, which is ultimately derived from the sovereign
demos, is to be accumulated, distributed, constrained, and exercised
legitimately and without the use of brute force or naked violence.
Democratic politics is therefore the legitimate way of competing for
and acquiring the constrained public power to make decisions for a
society as a whole — and of enforcing those decisions. Such collective
choice usually takes the form of public laws, policies, and regulations
and is the authoritative means by which society is ordered, disciplined,
coordinated, organized, controlled, monitored, punished, directed, cor-
rected, or — in a word — ruled.
Echoing Bernard Crick’s (1962) renowned defense of politics, Stoker
(2006, 7) has recently given a passionate justification of the importance
of (democratic) politics:
“. . . politics can provide a means of getting on with your fellow human
beings that aims to find a way forward through reconciliation and compro-
mise without recourse to straightforward coercion or outright violence. It
provides a way to live in an ordered manner with your neighbours, but
one that unavoidably often calls on you to sign up to deals and compro-
mises that might not be your first or even tenth choice, but which never-
theless have something in them that enables you to put up with them. It
might not be very inspiring, but when it works politics delivers one
great benefit: it enables you to choose, within constraints, the life you
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want without fear of physical coercion and violence being used against
you. Politics creates space for human choice and diverse lifestyles.
Politics, if done well, creates the positive context and stable environment
for you to live your life. That’s why politics matters.”
(Democratic) politics, then, is critical for the integration of modern
societies, each and every one of which is after all, to varying degrees,
characterized by large differences between citizens in sources of
power, identities, interests, and opinions. Politics in general is the way
in which the social and cultural conflicts, which emanate from these
differences, are dealt with in an imposing yet non-violent way.
Democratic politics goes one step further, for the reason that it aims to
solve potentially disruptive conflicts by institutionalizing both the con-
flict lines themselves (as with the translation of social and cultural clea-
vages into parties and political institutions) and the solutions to deal with
such conflicts (as in public laws, policies, and regulations). When demo-
cratic politics fails to live up to the promise of peaceful reconciliation, the
constitution of society is at risk.
The distressing observation, which motivates this essay, is that — in
spite of the growing popularity of democracy as a political regime
around the globe — all well established (and new) democracies are con-
fronted with increasing public dissatisfaction and disillusionment with
politics. Ultimately, this is not only jeopardizing democracy as a
system of governance, but also endangering the brittle fabric of a well
integrated society.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I focus on how the current demo-
cratic predicament is perceived and explained. I notice a somewhat
one-sided orientation on the citizen as ultimately the one to blame for
the sorry condition of democracy. In Section 3, I offer a reconceptualiza-
tion of the democratic crisis, in terms of the relationship of political alle-
giance between democratic rulers and the public. I argue that three large
scale political projects (Nation-State Building, Democratization, Welfare
State) and one primarily elite mission (European Integration) have been
structuring favorably the long-term relationship between the rulers
and the ruled under democratic conditions. These political projects and
mission were capable of enchanting the ruled and the rulers, because
they were characterized by a form of political quasi-messianism. In
Section 4, I elaborate the thesis that the disenchantment of politics,
understood as the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of
this-worldly salvation, is causing the decline of political allegiance and
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that this occurs because of (1) the failure, (2) the growth beyond limits,
(3) the success, and (4) the unintended effects of interaction of the pro-
jects and mission. Ironically, then, just as the great separation, the twin
tolerations and the separation of church and state were existential con-
ditions for democratic politics, it is the complete elimination of even
the remnants of political religion from democratic political projects and
missions that seems to be undermining the very political vigor of the
democratic polities of the West. In Section 5, I summarize the argument
and discuss some possible consequences of the thus created political void
in democracies. The trend in Europe seems to be that this void is offering
opportunities for anti-political entrepreneurs and hazardous political
experiments, including (xenophobic) populism and (utopian) fundament-
alisms of various sorts, while the American case and President Obama
may be indicating that a further personalization of politics with a messia-
nistic type of charismatic leadership is an option too.
2. UNIVERSAL DISAFFECTION
It is not difficult to notice, as many have done, the great paradox of demo-
cratic politics of our time. On the one hand, if anything, in the past three
decades, we have witnessed the increasing esteem, legitimacy, and
triumph of democracy as a regime throughout the world, while, on the
other hand, we have been observing an increasing dissatisfaction with
politics, and the loss of confidence in the performance of government
in new and well established democracies (Stoker 2006; Torcal and
Montero 2006a; Hay 2007). Democracy is at once becoming more
and less well-liked, or so it seems.
If we look at the bright side, we see that, in spite of a recent setback,
there has been a remarkable increase in the number of countries with a
free and democratic political system in the past 30 years or so, from 42
(24 percent) in 1974 to 90 (47 percent) in 2007, and a decline in the
number of not free countries, from 64 (41 percent) to 43 (22 percent)
over the same period). In 2007, about 46 percent (3,004,990,000
people) of the world’s population lived in a free country (Freedom
House 2008; Puddington 2007). Moreover, support for democracy as
the best possible form of government is remarkably high in all regions
of the world. The World Values Survey, for instance, includes the
thesis “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other
form of government.” In all nations except one (Nigeria), an
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overwhelming majority (ranging from 62 percent in Russia to 99 percent
in Denmark) of respondents agrees with this statement (Inglehart 2007).
At the same time, however, there is a dark side, since all well estab-
lished and new democracies are confronted with increasing dissatisfaction
and disillusionment with politics. This is evidenced by such indicators as
the decline in electoral turnout and party membership, increasing voter
volatility (¼ decreasing partisan commitment), dwindling levels of
trust in political institutions and actors, and growing political cynicism.
Table 1, for instance, shows for various institutions net levels of trust,
that is to say, “the proportion of respondents indicating a tendency to
trust minus those indicating a tendency not to trust” (Hay 2007, 34).
It is evident that political parties are by far the least trusted institutions,
closely followed by government, parliament, large corporations, and trade
unions. In neither the United States nor any of the European Union
countries do the three core institutions of democracy — political
parties, Congress/parliament and government — score positive for trust
and confidence (Mair 2006, 45; Torcal and Montero 2006b).
Particularly intriguing is the observation (on the basis of data from the
Worlds Values Survey; Hay 2007) that, although democracy is considered
to be the best form of government, there is declining support for democ-
racy as inherently a good form of government. As Hay (2007, 33)
explains this discrepancy, there is evidence for “a rising tide of cynicism
and fatalism about the capacity of even the best — democratic — system
of government to provide good outcomes.” If democracy is considered to
be the best form of government, but not essentially a good form, and if at
the same time satisfaction with this least bad alternative is declining, then
its future as a, in all senses, popular form of governance is perhaps more
gloomy than some may believe.
One might add, somewhat speculatively perhaps, but no less worri-
some, that decreasing expectations in the established and new democratic
world of what this system of governance is capable of delivering, may
reinforce what Freedom House recently has identified as “freedom stag-
nation,” namely that “the percentage of countries designated as Free has
failed to increase for nearly a decade” (Puddington 2007, n.p.).
Increasing levels of political disaffection in advanced democracies may
not only dampen popular expectations in countries that are currently
not free (after all, why put your hopes on a system that apparently gener-
ates estrangement among the public in free countries?), but also nega-
tively affect the authoritarian elites’ appraisal of “the people” as a
possible source of legitimate political power and, accordingly, lessen
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their willingness even to engage in (small-scale) democratic experiments.
In fact, key authoritarian regimes (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and
Venezuela) “are pursuing a comprehensive set of illiberal policies that
are contesting democracy in practical terms, as well as in the broader
battle of ideas. Increasingly sophisticated and backed by considerable
resources, these efforts are challenging assumptions about the inevitabil-
ity of democratic development” (Freedom House 2008, 3).
The explanations for the disquieting reality in functioning democracies
are manifold, ranging from those who emphasize bad performance of
economic and political institutions, to those who highlight lack of
social capital and civic engagement as causes of the public’s distrust
of politics and declining democratic proclivities (Torcal and Montero
2006a). A survey of the literature shows that actually only a small
number of accounts stress as the source of political disengagement the
questionable role of a worn-out, unimaginative and deficient political
elite, and ill-adapted political institutions more generally. Most (aca-
demic and journalistic) accounts are, certainly, very critical of what pol-
itical parties and politicians do, but remain generally supportive of
politics as a process and of democracy as a regime. However, although
there are important exceptions (Hardin 2000; Mair 2008), there is a sur-
prisingly large number of analyses that, directly or indirectly, tend to
blame the citizen for a lack of commitment to and responsibility for
the public domain.
Table 1. Net Levels of Trust in Public Institutions in the United States and the
European Union, 2004a
European Union (25) United States
Political parties 263 269
National government 235 228
Congress/Parliament 225 234
United Nations þ15 214
Legal system 22 211
Police þ28 þ44
Military þ37 þ40
Church 23 þ14
Trade unions 216 232
Large corporations 234 258
Voluntary sector þ31 þ37
Press þ1 240
aAdopted from Hay (2007, 34).
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As Hay (2007, 39) argues, most explanations of political disaffection
and disengagement have been citizen or demand-side oriented, with a
tendency “to see its origins as resting not with changes in the supply
of political goods so much as with changes in the responsiveness to,
and desire for, such goods by their political consumers” (Hay 2007,
39). The dominant conviction seems to be that, when all is said
and done, there is something wrong with “the people,” the public, or
the citizen: (s)he lacks social capital and trust, is deprived socio-
economically and culturally, lacks information about good governance
or is simply better informed by the media about bad than about good
performance, has no interest in politics, does not participate, is too indi-
vidualized and calculating, is indifferent to what politicians do, simply
lacks the intellectual capacity to understand politics, or has rising expec-
tations that can never be met (Stoker 2006; Torcal and Montero 2006;
Hay 2007). The modern disengaged citizen is eager to claim rights (for
instance, freedom of expression), but fails to appreciate that these
rights come with (participatory) obligations to the very system that guar-
antees them. The citizenry is criticized for ignoring that voting, for
instance, is both a political right and a moral obligation or civic duty
(Lijphart 1997).
The political elites in established democracies have since long discov-
ered, even before dissatisfaction was expressed in popular and electoral
political apathy or protest (for instance, very low turnout, populist
revolts, inexplicable electoral swings), that their position is threatened
by declining popular support, not haphazardly for the political party
upon which their own power depends, but systematically for the very pol-
itical order of which their parties are an intrinsic constituent. They above
all blame the citizens (well documented in Hay 2007, 39–54), as can be
deduced from the fact that they have started to experiment with political-
institutional innovations to restore or increase citizen involvement in poli-
tics, so as to remedy the dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics,
and cope with the ensuing problems of legitimacy and effectiveness of
the system. Interestingly enough, contradictory solutions — depending
on the specific historical, institutional, and political context of a
country — are contemplated, including increasing and decreasing elec-
toral proportionality, strengthening and weakening parliamentary
power, centralizing and decentralizing public administration, expanding
and contracting the authority of the executive, outsourcing and reclaim-
ing public power, broadening and narrowing the opportunities for politi-
cal participation and contestation (Smith 2005; Wright 2006).
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The most conspicuous fact of all this is perhaps not the contradictory
nature of the various experiments in democratic engineering we observe,
but rather that evidently in all established democracies, no matter what
system prevails, elites consider reforms of the system of governance
necessary as they are faced with citizens who do not seem prepared, or
are ill-equipped, to fulfill their political duties. We are facing the puzzling
and disquieting truth that political disaffection is a universal attribute of
democracies and that citizens are to be blamed for this unhappy
condition.
The observation that “the malaise afflicting democratic governance
today is that many citizens rather wish they could do without politics”
(Stoker 2006, 203) is a crucial insight to the extent that it points to the
accomplishments of politics in and of democracy that are now taken
for granted. Many citizens are convinced that they can do without poli-
tics, and, to some extent, they can indeed. However, neither the political
elite nor the public seems to realize enough, or is ready to admit, that
their joint political projects, such as the project of democracy or the
welfare state, have empowered citizens to become more independent indi-
viduals (instead of, for instance, dependent members of a class, gender,
or other social group), by granting individual political and social rights
that are collectively guaranteed. Such successful political projects are
neither recalled nor appreciated for their provision of well-being and
physical, social, and economic security. At the same time, there are no
new political projects that are deemed necessary for the provision of
these important political goods and that could fill the void.
One pivotal exception might be President Obama, whose inaugural
address set out to promote and disseminate civic virtues and values
(“honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity,
loyalty and patriotism”) that are “rooted in an ethic of the common good”
(Kim 2009, n.p.). Kim (2009) suggests the following: “With his combi-
nation of charisma and the attribution of elevated purpose to the work
of politics, Obama has proven astonishingly effective in generating an
enchantment about new possibilities, about a renewed American dream,
and about the centrality of a public language of hope.” It shows that
under conditions of political disaffection and personalization or
candidate-centered politics (Wattenberg 1991; also see King 2002),
charismatic leadership is still possible and capable of stirring up an extra-
ordinary political passion. However, in the context of my argument, it
must be stressed that, no matter how impressive Obama’s magnetism
and political performance are, it remains to be seen how far this
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remarkable fervor surpasses his personal appeal and extends to his
political project. Obama’s “project,” program or agenda is officially sum-
marized as “a plan to revive the economy; provide affordable, accessible
health care to all; strengthen our public education and social security
systems; define a clear path to energy independence and tackle climate
change; end the war in Iraq responsibly and finish our mission in
Afghanistan; work with our allies to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon” (change.gov 2009). However, it is doubtful that this
agenda is of the same caliber as the enchanting projects I identify.
Overall, then, successful political projects seem to have been losing
their capacity to arouse enthusiasm and passion for politics as a collective
undertaking; yet no new political projects of this kind have come up as a
replacement. It seems to me that a sense of purpose has been lost. What is
the point of citizens participating massively and enthusiastically if they
cannot identify any worthy purpose other than solving petty daily pro-
blems of party power and personal position? If politics is a struggle
between different views of the good life or good society, with underlying
value conflicts between equality and liberty, as Stoker (2006) suggests,
and if this is what once incited people to engage, then we must conclude
that the sources of disengagement and dissatisfaction concern the evapor-
ation of precisely this kind of struggle. At a deeper level, then, I would
suggest, we are concerned with the loss of appeal of politics as compris-
ing projects that were worth believing and even participating in, that is to
say, projects that once promised to help bring about a better world,
perhaps not here and now, but at least in the foreseeable future, and
that because of this quality were enchanting. It is this property that
seems to have been exhausted and it is this process that is described by
the disenchantment of politics.
Therefore, in order to understand better the current condition of dissa-
tisfaction and disaffection, it seems crucial to appreciate what, to begin
with, were the sources of satisfaction and affection. If we wish to grasp
how we lose our political aspirations and get disappointed, we need to
appreciate what it was that once made politics attractive, appealing, cap-
tivating, yes even mesmerizing in terms of ambition, animation, and
engagement. In other words, for a convincing answer to the puzzle of uni-
versal political disaffection in established and new democracies, we need
to take into account both what citizens expect from politics and what poli-
tics has to offer.
This seems all the more pressing because there is something deeply
disturbing about the citizen-oriented explanations of universal political
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disaffection and therefore about the remedies proposed. Since it is the
political elite itself that identifies the political tragedy in terms of civic
misbehavior and builds its contradictory remedies on this, this very defi-
nition of the democratic predicament as caused by the public tends to
aggravate the problem rather than contribute to its solution. Moreover,
the blame-the-citizen explanations are “dangerously circular (or tautolo-
gical),” as they do not offer more than a re-description of the explanan-
dum, for instance, “accounting for voter turnout by appeal to voter
apathy — where apathy is understood as little more than the propensity
of potential voters not to vote” (Hay 2007, 40). This demonstrates that,
in addition to the focus on the citizen, at least part of the democratic
predicament needs to be explained by referring also to the actions of the
political elite and/or the quality of their political programs and projects.
3. POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE AND ENCHANTMENT
In order to be able to capture better the current democratic predicament,
explain it, and reflect on its possible consequences, we need to rethink the
very issue, conceptualizing the problem, not so much in terms of the dis-
affection and disengagement of the public or the malfunctioning of the
political elite, but above all in terms of the relationship between the pol-
itical elite (the rulers) and the public (the ruled). This relationship, which
is fundamentally one of exchange and power and which is conceptualized
in terms of political allegiance, is deteriorating. The decline of political
allegiance results from the disenchantment of politics, that is to say, the
gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation.
Alan Milward (1997, 11) defined allegiance as “the range of all those
elements which induce citizens to give their loyalty to institutions of gov-
ernance, whether national, international or supranational.” Building on
this, I see political allegiance as a relationship of exchange and power
between the rulers and the ruled. It refers to the willingness of the
ruled to approve of and to support the decisions, made and imposed on
the public by a government, that affect their material and nonmaterial
interests, in return for a more or less immediate and straightforward
reward or benefit (security and well-being) to which the public feels
entitled on the basis of it having rendered approval and support (Van
Kersbergen 2000, 2003).
The “goods” of security and well-being are varied and manifold.
Security and well-being offered by a government can be territorial,
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physical, psychological, economic, and social. It must in principle be
understood in the broadest possible sense and ranges from issues of
war and peace to economic (for instance, employment and price stab-
ility), social (for instance, income maintenance), and psychological
(for instance, peace of mind and sense of belonging) security and well-
being. Diffuse support and obedience can be political, economic, social
and civil, and includes all forms of social and political participation,
ranging from the willingness to pay taxes and general law-abidingness
to voting and standing for office.
I propose three large scale political projects (Nation-State Building,
Democratization, and Welfare State) and one primarily elite mission
(European Integration) as having been crucial in structuring the long-
term relationship of allegiance between the ruler and the ruled. These
projects and mission have provided the key mechanisms of exchange
and investments in power. The exchanges and investments have produced
benefits for both the ruler (power) and the ruled (security and well-
being), establishing political allegiance.
What were the components of the political projects and mission that
were capable of enchanting the ruled and the rulers, generating a ben-
eficial relationship of allegiance between them? This, at a minimum,
we need to know, so as to be able to explain in some detail what disen-
chantment (explanans) is and what the key mechanisms are that link it to
declining political allegiance (explanandum). The answer, I think, has to
do with the fact that the projects and the mission were characterized by a
form of political quasi-messianism, which concerns the visionary antici-
pation of a better world that is attainable, here and in the distant, yet fore-
seeable future. This better world is within reach through human collective
intervention that aims to implement improvements in the human con-
dition, which, because of their promise, have an enchanting quality.
In this quasi-messianism, political callings assume a role that is similar
to the savior in messianism, offering relief and hope for this-worldly
redemption. In this quality, political projects, laden with an inspired
and imaginative sense of purpose, direction, and meaning, but also
with this-worldly catalysts, which are operational and practical, have
the capacity to enchant the political elite and public alike.
I introduce the concept of quasi-messianism here, so as to bring to light
some affinity with Talmon’s (1960) notion of political messianism as a
mind-set, a faith, a belief in the possibility of salvation here and now,
through the establishment of a just social order. Political messianism,
as Talmon saw it, however, is inherently totalitarian as it places the
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collective realization of political ideals above individual freedom. To
highlight the contrast particularly with this latter aspect, I use the term
quasi to indicate that the quality of messianism I refer to has only
some resemblance, particularly by virtue of the attribute of the belief
in the possibility of salvation here and now, but is evidently not quite
like Talmon’s necessarily totalitarian notion of messianism.
Political quasi-messianism once was an important feature of politics as
a vocation and a quality of political projects and missions that aimed to
reform the social order through political exchange and the exercise of
power. Political projects promised to liberate people from existential inse-
curity and material want. For some, such projects almost represented a
messiah in whom they could vest their hope for security and well-
being. For others, the projects were so abhorrent, that they were eager
to contest them, perhaps because they stood to lose much or conceivably
for the reason that they happened to believe in another one. The political
causes and the movements they inspired contained for some the promise
of triumph and the salvation of the world and for others perhaps no less
than perdition. But be that as it may, the political quasi-messianism in
these projects aroused political enthusiasm and passion; it led to
zealous devotion to leadership (not necessarily a leader), the cause, and
the movement, but therefore also gave rise to ardent conflicts that mobi-
lized large numbers of people, transferring them as active participants
from the private or depoliticized public domain into the realm of politics.
In an attempt to create some clarity in the conceptual field of political
religions and to designate, the theoretical location of the enchanting pro-
jects, I propose to represent the various fusions and confusions of religion
and politics as a continuum, arranged according to the extent to which
secular politics invades religion or religion penetrates politics (see
Fig. 1). The continuum ranges from the exclusively this-worldly focus
on the “finite ultimate” of the realm of worldly power and physical vio-
lence to the exclusively other-worldly focus on the “transcendental ulti-
mate” of ultimate truth and other-worldly salvation. Analytically, we
could look at this as politics traversing the boundaries of religion and
vice versa (this is indicated by the thick arrows between the two boxes
in Fig. 1). On the extreme, purely political, left of the continuum, we
find the secular politics of, for instance, liberalism and social democracy.
On the extreme, purely religious, right of the continuum, the world reli-
gions are placed.
Moving from the right to the left, religion moves into the political
sphere, from the world religions proper (Christianity, Islam, Judaism,
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Hinduism, Buddhism) to civic religion, religious politics (Christian and
Islamic Fundamentalism), the political religions (Jacobinism, Fascism,
National Socialism, Bolshevism), and further to missionary politics (right
wing populism), the quasi-religions (Humanism, Marxism, Nationalism),
and — via the enchanting projects (Nation-State, Democracy, Welfare
State, European Integration) — to the “unsecular politics” of Christian
Socialism, Confessional Politics, and Christian Democracy (with
Conservatism in between secular and unsecular politics). Moving from
the left to the right, politics penetrates the religious sphere, from unsecular
politics all the way back to civic religion.
In the projection of the continuum in Figure 1, missionary politics
and the quasi-religions are closest to the enchanting projects (quasi-
messianism), the former two much more infused by the religious
domain and the latter far more by the political realm. More generally,
we could say that the general structure that the religions proper all
have in common (Smith 1994) remains intact if we move from the
right to the left in the continuum of the figure. This general structure
ensues from the fact that all religions proper deal with the same basic
problem. They share the diagnosis of the human predicament: “based
on the nature of the religious ultimate aimed at locating what is wrong
with our natural existence and what separates us from an ideal fulfilment
in God, or Nirvana or the One”; this, in turn, leads to a quest “for that
reality which has the power to overcome the flaw in our being disclosed
in the diagnosis”; the quest, finally, is for a deliverer “which overcomes
the flaw and restores the wholeness of our being” (Smith 1994, 3).
Characteristic for the religions proper is that the ultimate goal is not any
finite reality. And this is precisely the difference with quasi-religions
(Humanism, Marxism and Nationalism in Smith’s case) that also have a
structure of diagnosis, quest and deliverer, but define their ultimate as
finite and of this world, and consider the transformation of man and the sol-
ution to the human predicament a distinct possibility within historical reach.
My treatment of Nation-State Building, Democratization, and the
Welfare State as enchanting projects and European Integration as an
enchanting political mission, can now be justified and explained. It is
founded on the idea that as projects and a mission, they certainly
lacked the strong religious connotations, which are so characteristic of
the quasi-religions and the political religions more generally, but they
still embodied somewhat of a visionary anticipation of a better world
through human intervention. Most importantly, they also had the same
basic structure of the quasi-religions. The analysis of the quasi-religions
44 van Kersbergen
offers the conceptual tools to map the fundamental characteristics of the
enchanting projects and mission (see Table 2).
Nation-State Building is a reaction to the problems of internal disorder
and the risk of conquest by other states and the violence this entails. The
state project is about achieving territorial order and stability that provides
physical security and protection against violence. In addition, when order
is guaranteed, well-being can become an option. The nation project con-
cerns the creation of a sense of belonging and the construction of a col-
lective identity of the population tied to the state and its territory. Among
the various means that promised to achieve all this were the establishment
of the state monopoly of the use of coercion and violence, the granting of
civil and nationality rights to define the populace and its character, and
the creation and reinforcement of a national bureaucracy (army, tax col-
lector) so as to multiply the resources (soldiers, money, personnel) and,
with that, the power of the state.
Similarly, Democracy was about achieving liberty, political equality,
just exchanges in social and economic life, political and legal reliability,
Table 2. The Fundamental Characteristics of Enchanting Projects
Diagnosis of flaws
Quest to what
promises to
overcome the flaws
Deliverer of
salvation and
release
Nation-State
building
Disorder, Conquest,
Violence
Monopoly of Use of
Coercion, Civil
Rights, Nationality,
Rational
Bureaucracy
Order, Physical
Security,
Protection, Well-
Being, Sense of
Belonging,
Collective Identity
Democracy Oppression,
Domination,
Exploitation,
Arbitrariness
Rechtsstaat, Liberties,
Political
Participation,
Political Equality
Basic Rights,
Inclusion,
Predictability,
Self-
Determination,
Political Security
Welfare State Inequality, Poverty,
Insecurity, Risk,
Mass
Unemployment
Insurance, Social
Rights, Demand
Management
Social Security,
Freedom from
Want, Full
Employment
European
Integration
Anarchy, War,
Destruction,
Totalitarianism,
Economic
Underperformance
Institutionalized and
Supranational
Cooperation
between States,
Common Policies
Prevention of War,
Rescue of the
National state,
Collective
Security,
Prosperity
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and protection against the arbitrary power of the state. With the means
of the Rechtsstaat, various liberties, the extension of the possibilities of
active and passive political participation, and equal political rights (for
instance, one person, one vote), democratization established fundamental
and inalienable basic rights, included the whole population in the politi-
cal system, increased the predictability of state and government behavior,
greatly advanced the opportunities of self-determination, all of which
instituted a crucial sense of political security.
The Welfare State project was about fighting inequality, poverty, and
the social insecurity that resulted from industrial society and the
market economy. It organized for the population compelling ways to
deal with social risks and implemented public policies to stimulate econ-
omic growth and to combat the societal disruption that emanates from
poverty and mass unemployment. The welfare state did this by making
compulsory social insurance and enforcing solidarity on society, granting
and guaranteeing social rights, and by experimenting with various ways
of managing economic demand. The welfare state aspired to provide pro-
tection against, and freedom from, want, and full employment. It there-
fore offered, literally, social security.
The mission of European Integration was inspired by the specters of
anarchy in inter-state relations, the large destruction from two World
Wars, the fear of a possible third World War, the costs of competition
with totalitarian systems, and the economic underperformance of national
yet interdependent nation-states, which aggravated the other risks.
By institutionalizing ever closer forms of (supranational) cooperation
between sovereign states and developing common policies, European
Integration’s aim was to prevent a new war, help re-establish the
nation-states of Western Europe, provide a sense of collective security
among the European populations and stimulate economic and social
prosperity.
In sum, the three projects and the elite mission therefore share one
important feature: they established and reinforced political allegiance in
terms of a beneficial exchange of power/support and (physical, political,
social and collective) security and well-being.
4. DISENCHANTMENT AND THE WANING OF ALLEGIANCE
Now that the fundamental characteristics of the enchanting projects and
mission have been determined, I can discuss the notion of
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disenchantment. This concept is of course taken from Max Weber’s
“Entzauberung der Welt”. Disenchantment of the world, according to
Weber (1905, 114; 2005, 71) is “die Ausschaltung der Magie als
Heilsmittel” (the elimination of magic as an instrument of salvation).
This “great historic process in the development of religions . . . had repu-
diated all magical means to salvation as superstition and sin” (Weber
2005, 61). Paraphrasing this, the disenchantment of politics, then, is
defined as the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-
worldly salvation.
Disenchantment is the gradual disappearance of the enthusiastic belief
in the quest to what promises to overcome the flaws and the fading of the
conviction that the deliverer of salvation and release is known and imma-
nent, which are delineated by disenchantment. It concerns the progressive
abolition of quasi-messianism in politics and attempts to depict the
demise of the transformative vista in these political projects as redemp-
tion and revelation, and, with it, the loss of the fervent commitment of
both the rulers and the ruled. A corollary is that disenchantment lies at
the heart of the contemporary decline of political allegiance. An impor-
tant feature of politics gone astray concerns this idea of an almost reli-
gious collective human experience of captivating projects and leaders
and faithful and devoted followers — and ever so many ardent opponents
with challenging visions of the redemptive projects. Such political pro-
jects obtained their enchanting disposition to the extent that they were
capable of offering hope of redemption and an end to human suffering
in this world through the provision of various kinds of security. They
did this, not by posing grand utopias that assumed a complete makeover
of imperfect human nature, as in the case of the political religions, nor by
relapsing into the genuine religious guarantee of a better life after the
present, as in the case of the religions proper. No, they were enchanting
because they presented far-reaching yet level-headed reforms that took
into account the human condition without relinquishing every bit of
utopian zest.
The political projects of Nation-State Building, Democracy, Welfare
State, and the mission of European Integration, once promised to liberate
people from existential insecurity and material want. All dealt, in one way
or other, with how best to guaranty security (safety) and prosperity (well-
being). The promise of salvation and release of these projects and mission
fostered the relationship of allegiance between rulers and ruled. The loss
of this promise (or, ironically, its fulfilment) is what is summarized in the
disenchantment of politics.
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Several possible ways of looking at the relationship between disen-
chantment and political allegiance can be identified. Most obviously,
we could conceive of disenchantment in terms of the failure of the pro-
jects, for instance, the Nation-State and Democracy because of internatio-
nalization (most notably migration), the relocation of power and the
emergence of new forms of governance, or the Welfare State because
of various endogenous (ageing) and exogenous (economic interdepen-
dence) pressures. Allegiance is the victim when the projects fail,
because in this case, the projects are losing what made them enchanting
in the first place: their promise of salvation. This directly disrupts the
relationship between the ruler and the ruled and leads to the decline of
political allegiance. In the absence of new enchanting projects, this
increases disillusionment with the projects, and adds to the disenchant-
ment of politics, reinforcing the decline of political allegiance.
We could also imagine that the political projects of the Nation-State,
the Welfare State and Democracy, and the mission of European
Integration have reached a point where they have grown beyond their
limits. For instance, the further enlargement of the European Union east-
wards (Turkey) might seriously put at risk what is left of the permissive
consensus. The fiscal deficits of the state and increasing tax demands
might dangerously strain the moral willingness of state subjects to
behave as good and law-abiding citizens. Further democratization
might again overload the democratic system of governance with
demands that cannot be met. A vicious causal sequence of project disil-
lusionment, further disenchantment, and reinforced decline of political
allegiance would be the result.
Ironically, the disenchantment of politics is also most likely having
detrimental effects on political allegiance, because of the immense
success of the projects, as a result of which they are largely, but erro-
neously, taken for granted and lose their enchanting disposition. There
is, however, yet another, and in my understanding most important way,
in which the projects are connected to the decline of political allegiance,
namely through the mechanism of unintended effects of interaction. This
is, for instance, most clearly the case, where the mission of European
Integration meets the other projects. In the view of many people,
European integration formally puts into question the sovereignty of the
participating member states. The mission of European Integration does
not seem to enhance, but rather shrink the policy making efficacy of
the nation-state and is threatening its very survival as a sovereign insti-
tution. This causes great anxiety among both the elite and the public,
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because it damages the nation’s sense of belonging and its constructed
collective identity, and erodes the political elite’s position of power.
If the physical and psychological security offered by the nation-state
ceases to be the benefit for the ruled, support for the rulers comes to
an end. This anxiety is intensified by the fear that the European Union
is assaulting democracy and rapidly turning into a super-state. Finally,
the weakening and even vanishing of national borders as a result of
European integration is threatening national integration and social soli-
darity. There are serious risks that the territorially based solidarity,
which was elaborated in the welfare state in the post-war era, is under-
mined (Ferrera 2005) as European integration continues to de-structure
the nation-state and the social spaces contained within it, while not
restructuring at the supranational level the kind of solidarity that is still
currently expressed in the national welfare state.
5. CONCLUSION
The disenchantment of politics, that is to say, the gradual elimination of
politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation (once embodied in the
enchanting political projects of Nation-State Building, Democracy and
the Welfare State, and the elite mission of European Integration), is
causing the decline of political allegiance, that is to say, a deteriorating
relationship of exchange and power between the rulers (political elite,
government) and the ruled (people, citizens, voters). Disenchantment
occurs, because of the failure, the growth beyond limits, the success,
and the unintended effects of interaction of the projects.
Pondering over the possible consequences of waning political alle-
giance, we might hypothesize that the disenchantment of politics
causes a political void in contemporary democratic societies, an empti-
ness of collective power, which exerts a pull on various political enter-
prises, experiments and escapades. Some of these, such as Obama’s
charismatic leadership and his impressive performance so far (as of
June 2009), may be beneficial to democratic governance and an inspi-
ration for politicians and citizens around the globe. Still, his unspecified
conception of “change” and his overemphasis of political primacy and
capacity (“yes we can!”) may have generated expectations that are hard
if not impossible to satisfy and are therefore bound to disappoint.
Other political ventures — to a lesser or greater extent — could imperil
the very existence of democracy. We could think of the decomposition of
Quasi-Messianism and the Disenchantment of Politics 49
the political center and the increasing importance of fringe (flank) poli-
tics that many advanced democracies are currently experiencing. As a
result of this, coalition building, and effective government on the basis
of beneficial exchanges are becoming increasingly difficult. The resulting
ungovernability not only would contribute directly to the further disen-
chantment of politics, but would also reinforce the image of a, by and
large, impotent elite that seems to have only one rationale left to
govern: the protection of its own petty profitable position.
Here, both the toothless elite and the frustrated public become an easy
victim for populist entrepreneurs. Populists effectively turn around the
blame-the-citizen explanations of political disaffection and when these
political adventurers manage to link the existing general frustration about
politics with concrete problems of social and cultural integration, an explo-
sive mix occurs that seriously stirs up normal democratic politics as we
know it. Most European democracies seem to be captured by the populist
“Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004), especially, but not exclusively, articulated and
pronounced on the right-side of the political spectrum. We can observe a
sharper and vaster political mobilization of latent xenophobia that is essen-
tially directed against migration and the multicultural society. There is an
increasingly expressive discontent with political culture that is being
translated into a critique of political correctness and of prevailing public
morality. Latent xenophobia in society surfaces in the form of a frontal
assault on the moral pressure exerted on citizens not to speak negatively
about any aspect related to migration, particularly religion (Islam).
In addition, the articulation and politicization of popular dissatisfaction
with the performance of government, and the political cynicism with respect
to political elites that comes with it, is being converted into a revolt that
attacks elitism, intellectualism, the closed nature of political recruitment,
and the lack of representativeness of politicians more generally.
In a broader perspective, however, we should perhaps also recognize
that even the most vehement populist revolts — so far and to some
extent — have been channeled via democratic outlets and managed sur-
prisingly well. However, it is not excluded that much less innocuous pol-
itical enterprises are now seeking to fill the void. Europe does not have an
Obama and the success of contemporary Western populism insinuates
that popular sentiments and political enthusiasm predominantly hover
around the edges of the radical right. In the context of the imperfect inte-
gration of religious and ethnic minorities and continuing migration, there
is no guarantee that political firebrands will not find ways to tap into
xenophobic undercurrents too.
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John Gray (2007) has suggested that American foreign policy, in the last
decades or so, has lost its realism and increasingly has been permeated by an
apocalyptic, millennial belief in the immanent coming of democracy. The
democratic void has allowed utopianism to enter the mainstream and
September 11 has led to the Americanization of the apocalypse, exemplified
by United States neo-conservatism. It has turned Americans into armed mis-
sionaries for democracy and led to a war that had no achievable goals.
Democracy cannot be established in most of the Middle East countries,
nor can terrorism be exterminated. Hence, as Gray stresses, Iraq is a 21st
century utopian experiment, with the same disastrous results as the utopian
experiments of the 20th century: “the picture of post-war Iraq that neo-con-
servatives disseminated was a tissue of disinformation and wishful thinking,
while the willingness to use intolerable means to achieve the impossible end
showed the utopian mind at its most deluded” (Gray 2007, 160).
In other words, perhaps less easily recognizable, but equally if not more
inauspicious political ventures may already have been filling the democratic
void. Some sinister political enterprises, such as American missionary
democracy, have not been launched from the outside, but from within, that
is to say, they have been operating as “normal” democratic politics, but are
dangerously utopian in their dogma. At the same time, from the outside,
we see various fundamentalisms, including Christian, Islamic, Hebrew,
and Eco-, organizing, penetrating the system, and influencing the conditions
and possibility of democratic politics and debate. Fundamentalism is, of
course, deeply at odds with democracy, because it denies every single prin-
ciple on which democracy thrives (Taverne 2005). So far, it is unclear
whether President Obama’s difficult mission to “renormalize” American
foreign policy on this point and eradicate utopianism will be successful.
Reluctantly, but forced to do so, I end with a pessimistic note.
Currently, I see no real project or mission on the horizon, which could
be interpreted as comparably enchanting, sagacious, yet still cautious,
as the projects of the Nation-State, Democracy, the Welfare State, and
European Integration. Yes, the Obama phenomenon, even though it
does not entail such a project, does leave a gleam of hope because of
its reinvigoration of politics. But most political enterprises that are
filling the democratic void seem to be endangering democracy.
NOTES
1. Except, that is to say, where religion is an explicit reference in politics, such as in European and
Latin-American Christian democracy (Van Kersbergen 1995; Kalyvas 1996; Mainwaring and Scully
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2003) or other “unsecular” political movements (Kalyvas 2003), or where religious and political
agenda’s have always been mixed to some extent or have recently converged spectacularly, such
as in the religious right in the United States (Lambert 2008).
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